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JUDICIAL ATTITUDES AND
POLICY-MAKING
IN THE DIXON COURT*
by GLENDON SCHUBERT**
Political man, according to a well-known definition by Harold D. Lass-
well, is he who displaces his private attitudes upon public objects, and then
rationalizes the result on the basis of what he claims to be the public interest.'
A question upon which lawyers and political scientists tend to differ concerns
the extent to which it is appropriate, in public discussion, to describe the
decisional behavior of judges as political. No doubt much of the apparent
difference in professional perspective, as between lawyers and political scien-
tists, reflects the corresponding difference in emphasis, in the orientations
toward judges, of the two professions. Lawyers seek to exercise a monopoly
of influence upon and control over the judicial function; and to become a
judge is an ultimate professional goal for many, if not most, lawyers, who
understandably feel a considerable vested interest in defending the judiciary
against the usually misguided, always (by definition) "unprofessional," and
indeed often potentially dangerous, disclosures of laymen. Non-legal critique
of judicial institutions is an assault upon the interests of every lawman. Politi-
cal scientists, on the other hand, tend (at least, in modern times) to view
judges as makers of public policy who ought to be studied by means of the
same theories and methods as are employed in the analysis of political be-
havior generally. The vested interest of the political scientist lies in describing,
analyzing, and predicting how public policy gets made; and in polities such
*For support of the larger research project concerning which this article is a partial
report, I thank the Institute of Advanced Projects of the Center for Cultural and Tech-
nical Interchange Between East and West, and the Social Science Research Institute, both
of the University of Hawaii; and the Asian Studies Center of the Office of International
Programs of Michigan State University. For advice and assistance, I am particularly
indebted to Professor Henry Mayer of the Department of Government of the University
of Sydney.
**A.B. (1940), Ph. D. (1948), Syracuse University; University Professor of Political
Science and Law, York University, Toronto, Canada.
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as the American or the Australian, where judges clearly play and have played
a major role in the shaping of the political destinies of the nation, it would
be both reprehensible and irresponsible for political scientists to fail to include
judges in their designs for research.
The present article is written by a political scientist (and a non-Australian,
to boot) with the objective of providing for lawyers a basis for better under-
standing of the doubly alien point of view, toward judicial behavior, of
American political science. The explicit subject-matter concerns the Australian
High Court, and the author thus far has been able to pursue his inquiry
about the Court only through reading and not on the basis of first-hand
observation and experience. Data so limited in scope are bound to be inade-
quate in various respects-not so much in comparison to the conventional
research basis for legal commentary, but rather when appraised against one's
ideals of what needs to be done in order to do the job properly. The author's
lack of a law degree may be reckoned a handicap; but a much greater dif-
ficulty is posed by the problem faced by any person who seeks to project his
own understanding into, and to make interpretations on the basis of, what
is for him an alien culture-politically, socially, psychologically, and econ-
omically-in which he has not been reared. But half a loaf is better
than none.
There can be no doubt that judges make decisions about matters which,
in Lasswellian terms, we can fairly describe as "public objects." Similarly,
it is even literally true that judicial opinions are intended to function as post
hoe statements of rational justification, pro and con, judicial decisions. The
only part of Lasswell's definition about which any disagreement seems possible
is the first part: do judges make decisions on the basis of their private atti-
tudes? Or, to the contrary, are judges merely technicians, "bureaucrats" in
the Weberian idiom (and "experts" in the Laskian), whose task is to utilize
their specialized knowledge about (and authority to pronounce) consensually-
approved systems of norms that have been formulated by actors other than the
immediate judicial decision-makers? These are the horns of the dilemma as
it typically is posed; but the dichotomy, like many attempts to oversimplify
the frequency distributions of continuous variates by enfolding2 them into a
nominal measure, can be (and usually is) very misleading. In life (including
judicial life) as in statistics, it all depends upon where and how one draws
the cutting points.8 Unless one is prepared to dismiss as invalid much of the
work done in modem psychology, there is no physiological alternative to
the proposition that judges decide on the basis of their "private" attitudes.'
However, such a resolution of the question is merely semantic, because attitude
defined thus broadiy-and this is the meaning that will be attributed to it by
the present author-subsumes concepts of institutional role and of professional
2 Cf. C. Coombs, A THEoRY oF DATA (New York: Wiley, 1964) pp. 9-11 and Ch. S.
3 R. G. Francis, Tnm RHEToRic OF ScIENcE (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1961); H. Blalock, CASUAL INFERENCES xN NONEXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961).
4 S. G. Tomkins and C. E. Izard, AipECT, CoGNIToN, AND PERsoNALITY (New
York: Springer, 1965). Cf. A. F. Davies, PRIVATE PoLrrcs (Melbourne: Melbourne
University Press, 1966).
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obligation which, as understood by lawyers, would be articulated under such
familiar rubrics as "stare decisis" and "due process of law." All judges make
policy, to some extent; and all judges are technicians, to some extent. Some
judges, such as those who act in the role of municipal magistrates in traffic
courts, have considerable discretion to control how questions will be framed
for judicial decision, but relatively little discretion over the verbal statements
of norms which are invoked to rationalize, and presumably to guide, their
decisions. Supreme court justices, on the other hand, are specialists in the
casting and recasting of verbal statements of norms, and their primary concern
is with the policy component of adjudication. The extent to and the manner
in which judicial decisions are affected by the beliefs, opinions and attitudes
of judges will depend upon the time, place, and circumstances; but there has
been no relevant time in the history of the United States Supreme Court (or,
it is submitted as being highly probable, in that of the High Court of Aus-
tralia) during which an understanding of the private attitudes of the justices
has not been of critical importance to the public policy outcomes preferred
by the court.
The present report is based on an analysis of part of the data collected
for research, concerning the High Court, that the author has been carrying
out in recent years. The time period covered extends for a decade, from Sir
John Latham's de facto retirement as Chief Justice on May 11, 1951, to
the appointment of Justice Sir Francis Owen on September 22, 1961. Only
nine men served during this time, and the two changes of personnel both
occurred during the middle third of 1958. Thus, we shall deal with what
from a sociological point of view are two different "courts," 5 the first sitting
from 1951-58, and the second from 1958-61, although a majority subgroup of
five of the justices were members of both courts and served (subject to a
caveat for Taylor) 6 throughout the decade. The period sampled corresponds
to volumes 84-107 of the Australian Law Reports, which were the source
of the raw data: the reports of the decisions of the Court and the opinions
of the justices. All cases heard in appellate jurisdiction and decided with
opinion(s) were included in the sample, providing that they were reported
as having been decided within the period defined by the boundary dates.
The result totaled 710 decisions of the High Court, of which about a fourth
(187) were nonunanimous or "split" decisions, in the sense that one or more
r Because of changes in the composition of the small decision-making group. Cf.
Snyder, The Supreme Court as a Small Group, (1958) 36 SocIAL FoRcEs 232-238.
6 Actually there were three such courts, because Sir Alan Taylor was not appointed
until September 2, 1952, so there was one six-man court without an active Chief during
the first year; a full seven-man court with a very active Chief during the next half dozen
years; and a somewhat different seven-man court with the same Chief during the final
three years. But we shall ignore what may possibly prove to have been important differ-
ences between the first and the next six years, and distinguish only between an initial
seven-year period, and a later three-year period. (Statistically-minded readers may choose
to view this treatment of the data, made as it was in order to maximize the size of the
sample, as a potential source of error variance; those whose taste runs to the rhetoric of
the humanities may prefer to conceptualize the matter as a case of robbing Peter to pay
Paul.)
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of the participating justices disagreed with the outcome favored by the Court.7
There were a total of 3248 participations or votes; and the average size deci-
sion-making panel of the Court (4.6) included about two-thirds of the incum-
bent justices-actually, panels for split decisions (4.9) tended to be slightly
larger than those for unanimous decisions (4.5). A total of 2977 opinions
were associated with these decisions, so opinions accompanied almost all
(92%) of the votes; or, stated otherwise, there were on the average about
four (4.2) opinions delivered per decision.' These findings stand in sharp con-
trast to the corresponding ones for the United States Supreme Court,' whose
average ratio of participation is much higher, and ratio of opinions to partici-
pation is much lower, reflecting (of course) the differences in customs and
institutional roles that have obtained, for these two courts, at least during the
period of their co-existence.'0
Our particular concern here is with the interrelationship among three
classes of variables which relate to the votes of the High Court justices in the
7 During the same ten year period, the United States Supreme Court decided on
the merits 1749 cases, of which 946 (54%) were non-unanimous. The Supreme Court,
therefore, decided over twice as many cases in absolute terms; and the Supreme Court
divided in voting twice as frequently as did the High Court. Consequently, the corre-sponding sample of split decisions available for the study of the Supreme Court is five
times larger than the present High Court sample.
8 Disagreement in opinions was more widespread than that concerning outcomes,
because dissenters almost without exception disagreed with the opinions of justices who
voted in the majority; and majority justices were by no means in invariant agreementconcerning rationales. Moreover, opinion differences were observed to obtain frequentlyin decisions for which the vote as to outcome was unanimous, and such "unanimous"
decisions were much more numerous than those in which a division of votes occurred.
I have reserved the subject of opinion agreement and disagreement for discussion inanother article, Social Attributes and Opinion Agreement Among High Court Justices,
(April, 1968) 4 AusTAIAN AND NEw ZEALAND JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 1-16; and see
also my The Dimensions of Decisional Response: Opinion and Voting Behaviour of theAustralian High Court," in I. Grossman and J. Tanenhaus (eds.), FRONTIERS OF
JUDICIAL RESEARCH (New York: Wiley, 1969), pp. 163-195.
9 The average size decision-making panel of the Supreme Court, for a much larger
sample of split decisions extending for an overlapping period of over a decade and ahalf, was 8.6; and the ratio of participation (i.e., the average size divided by the maxi-mum size of the Court) was .95 (rather than the .66 for the High Court). On the other
hand, the ratio of opinions to voting appears to be much lower for the American court;what seem to be the only available reported data indicate that for one recent Supreme
Court justice, whose tenure overlapped in part the earlier period for our present High
Court sample, the ratio of his opinions to his votes was only .15. Robert Jackson wrote
a total of 302 opinions (for the Court, concurring, or dissenting) during his dozen termsof participation in an estimated total of 2065 votes on the merits. I have corrected the
Court's estimated total of 2347 decisions by Jackson's participation rate of 88% (forsplit decisions, 1946-53 Terms) which I have assumed for present purposes to apply
also to unanimous decisions and for the earlier four terms, which are taken fromPritchett but corrected by a weight of 1.5, since his data do not include per curiam
decisions on the merits, as the other data do. For the opinion data, see my article,Jackson's Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis, (1965) 49
AMERICAN POLiTCAL SCIENCB REVIEW 941; for the decisional and voting -data, see(1941-44 Terms) C. H. Pritchett, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (New York: Macmillan,
1948) 25; and (1946-53 Terms) my THE JUDIcIAL MIND: ATrrrUEs AND IDEOLOGIES
OF SUPREME COURT JusncES, 1946-1963 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1965) 45, 50-57.
lo Cf. Anon., The High Court, (August 14, 1967) 40 CURRENT AFFAms BULLETInNo. 6; and I. Schmidhauser, Trl SUPREME COURT: ITS POLITICS, PERSONALITIES, an
PROCEDURES (New York: Rinehart, Holt, and Winston, 1960).
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split decisions of the sample. The three classes of variables include: (1) the
attributes, or background characteristics of the justices; (2) the extent of their
participation in these decisions; and (3) similarities and differences in their
voting behavior. The objective of our inquiry will be to examine the correla-
tions between pairs of these three classes of variables, thereby describing both
the patterns and the degrees of relationships that obtained among them, for
the period of our sample. Such an analysis will fall short of the prediction of
relationships that one would require of a theory that could be deemed scienti-
fic; but the present work will at least constitute a step in the direction of,
and may even help to lay the basis for, the subsequent construction of a
social scientific theory of the behavior of judges in Australia.
Attributes
An attempt was made to collect systematic information concerning an
extensive array of background characteristics for the nine justices in the
sample. Among the subjects of inquiry were: the location, size, and socio-
economic aspects of the community in which the judge was raised; his rela-
tives and family connections; the occupation of his father, father-in-law, and
other close male relatives; his age; his ancestry; religion; education; legal,
governmental, and other occupational experience; partisan affiliation and
political activity; social clubs and similar group affiliations; military experience;
honors and awards; and publications and academic ties. Published sources of
biographical data, available in the United States, were of course quite inade-
quate to provide the required information; and so the author arranged to
employ a qualified graduate student in the social sciences, at an Australian
university, to assist by searching through sources available in Sydney libraries.
The results are disappointing, because it proved impossible to acquire any
information about many of the items on the schedule; and only for a few
are there systematic data for all nine justices. Nevertheless, analysis of the
compiled returns shows that it is highly probable that the justices of the High
Court constituted a very much more homogeneous group than did any subset
of the same number of justices of the American Supreme Court during the
1950's. Our interest, however, is in identifying attributes, for which theory
suggests a plausible potential bearing upon the making of decisional choices,
in regard to which there are differences of importance among the High Court
justices in the sample; characteristics on which they are all alike may bear
an important relationship to their decision-making, but such shared attributes
are of absolutely no help in accounting for differences in the voting behavior
of the justices. All, for example, held university law degrees; and all belonged
to exclusive, upper-class social clubs-reflecting, no doubt, their typically
middle-class origins. (There was no Isaacs nor Higgins nor Evatt in this
group; to have included such social radicals in the sample it would have
been necessary to study an earlier period in the Court's development.)"
n For a study which does include these more progressive judges, see Blackshield,
Guttman Scales and the Neutralist Ideology: The High Court of Australia, 1903-1967,
(forthcoming).
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Two characteristics for which complete data are readily available are
age and domicile. Age is potentially relevant because it is an index to the
pattern of dominant cultural norms of a person's youth and socialization,"2
and to his direct experience (and therefore, internalized understanding) of
major upheavals for his society (such as those accompanying a major war
or depression). Moreover, there are biological correlates of maturation which
suggest the likelihood that age-mates are more apt to share social interests
than are persons separated by generational differences. Domicile has a poten-
tial bearing upon judicial behavior because of the distinctive subcultural dif-
ferentiations found in various regions of a country. Even in relatively homo-
geneous countries like Japan and the United States and Australia, such dis-
tinctions are among the first and most obvious ones which natives are quick
to perceive in each other. It takes no Professor Henry Higgins for the man
from Tokyo to identify his country cousin from Kyushu; Mississippians are
noticeably different, in many respects that reciprocally are deemed important,
from Bostonians; and one gathers from a perusal of Australian social history
that equivalent distinctions are perceived as between, for example, Melbourne
and Darwin.
The dimension of age constitutes one of the relatively few variables in
social science research for which ratio scaling is possible; but because the
other variables with which comparisons must be made are much cruder, only
slight advantage can be taken of this facet of the statistical potential of the
data on judicial age. In fact, there are two principal clusters of age-mates
in the sample: an older group of five justices (Dixon, Webb, Williams, Ful-
lagar, and McTiernan) all of whom were born during the half-dozen years
from 1886-1892, and four others (Windeyer, Taylor, Kitto, and Menzies)
all of whom were born during the present century and within a seven-year
span of each other. The difference between the means for these two groups is
thirteen and a half years, or almost half a generation; and the gap between
Chief Justice Owen Dixon, the senior in point of both age and tenure, and
Douglas Menzies, the youngest and most recently appointed justice in the
sample, is twenty-one years. All, of course, were past fifty at the time they
joined the Court; but there remained this division in their relative elderliness.
Because the highest common level of measurement possible for the set of
attribute variables is ordinal, the age variable was scored as ranks for
purposes of comparison with other variables.
"2 As Danelski has pointed out, the present expectation is that the Supreme Court
of Japan will become even more conservative in terms of "the Court's lack of activism
in the protection of human rights. My guess [Danelski continued] is that in this regard
things are probably going to get worse before they get better. The reason is that if
appointments are made much as they are now, the men coming to the Court in the
next ten years will have been born around 1910. Unlike some of their predecessors,
they will not have had the experience of the liberal World War I period and the early
Taisho Democracy in their backgrounds. In interviews with retired justices and high court
judges, the importance of this period of modern Japanese history often came up,
especially in regard to the genesis of their liberal ideas which, in some cases, they
wrote in Supreme Court opinions .... " The Supreme Court of Japan: An Exploratory
Study, p. 17 (mimeographed paper presented at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, New York City, September 10, 1966).
(VOL. 7, NO. 1
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For the dimension of domicile, there was no very meaningful alternative
to trichotomization: five of the justices were from New South Wales (Mc-
Tiernan, Williams, Kitto, Taylor, and Windeyer) and, in testimony to the
equity-except for the rest of the country-of the prevailing system of
judicial appointment,- another three of the justices came from Victoria
(Dixon, Fullagar, and Menzies); the remaining justice was Webb (from
Queensland).
Age is a natural interval scale that clustered (empirically, for this
sample) nominally but was converted to ranks for intercorrelation; domicile,
though there were only the three categories, was scaled ordinally, with the
highest rank (hypothesized to be most conservative) assigned to Victoria,
and the lowest rank to Queensland. All intercorrelations discussed below
are Spearman (rho) rank correlation coefficients.
A third attribute variable was constructed as an index combining several
discrete characteristics which, as it was assumed, could be scaled in the same
direction along a single dimension of conservatism and liberalism. The four
subcomponents of the index are: partisan affiliation of the justice himself .(as
reinforced by his own prior political activity), partisan affiliation of the
government appointing a justice, religious affiliation, and familial socio-
economic status. For each of these components, scores were assigned accord-
ing to the subcategories denoted below. The direction of alignment was con-
servative; therefore, each category so designated was scored as ±1 if observed
to obtain for a justice; liberal categories were scored -1; and neutral cate-
gories were scored zero. For the political party component, affiliation with
the Liberal Party was positive, and the Labour Party was negative. (For this
component only, an intensity weighting was used, in that the score was
doubled if a justice could be identified as having engaged directly in partisan
political activity, as in campaigning publicly for, or in serving in, legislative
office.) For the appointment component, the six appointees of Sir Robert
Menzies were of course scored as positive; McTiernan's appointment by the
Scullins Labour Government in 1930, and Webb's by the Chiffley Govern-
ment in 1946, were considered negative; but Dixon's appointment to the
Court in 1929, by the Bruce-Page Government, was scored as neutral. Affilia-
tion with the Anglican or Presbyterian Church was deemed positive, and
Roman Catholicism, negative; Dixon, an avowed agnostic who professed to
' The distribution of states of domicile of all members of the High Court, including
the nine justices in the present sample, is: New South Wales, 14 (58%); Victoria, 7
(29%); Queensland, 3 (12%); and South Australia, Western Australia, and Tasmania,
0 (0%). Measurements of the domicile variable in previously published reports on this
research assign Kitto to Victoria instead of to New South Wales. I am indebted to Tony
Vinson for his Comment on 'Opinion Agreement Among High Court Justices,' (1968)
4 AusTRALIAN AD NEW ZEALND JouRNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 158-59, in which he points
out that Kitto, though born in Victoria, was reared and educated in New South Wales.
The measurements of domicile discussed here have been recalculated to take into
account this correction.
1969]
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no religion, was scored neutral. Most of the justices came from middle-class
14
families with fathers and/or fathers-in-law who were clergymen, solicitors,
or merchants; these were scored as positive on the economic component.
McTiernan's father was a policeman, and this was scored as negative (that is,
as constituting a lower or working-class occupation). The matrix of scores
is reported in Table I, from which it can be observed that over a fourth of
the cells are blank, indicating that information, for a particular justice on a
particular characteristic, is unknown to the author. Only for three justices
TABLE I. SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL SCALE OF
CONSERVATISM AS A BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTIC
Index Judicial
Judge Religion Economic Appointment Partisan Sum Rank
Windeyer ............ +1 +1 +1 +2 +5 1
Menzies .............. +1 +1 +1 +1 +4 2
Fullagar .............. +1 +1 +1 +3 3.5
Williams .............. +1 +1 +1 +3 3.5
Kitto .................... +1 +1 +2 5
Dixon .................. 0 +1 0 +1 6.5
Taylor .................. +1 +1 6.5
Webb .................... -1 -1 -2 8
McTiernan ......... -1 -1 -1 -1 -4 9
(Windeyer, Menzies, and McTiernan) is full information available on all four
components, and in the case of one (Taylor) only his age was ascertained.
Of course one would have more confidence in an index for which there were
no missing data; but Table I represents the best information the author could
get, and it seems unlikely that the reduction of his ignorance would bring
about any dramatic changes in the rank order of the justices on the index
scale. Half of the blank cells, for instance, are for the political party affilia-
tions of five justices; and although the author is unable to assert positively
that Fullagar, Dixon, Taylor, and Kitto were anti-Labour in their sympathies,
it does seem unquestionable that they were not Labourites. Similarly, even if
it could be proved that Webb was a Labour Party Member, or sympathizer,
this would not change his order in the next to bottom rank on the scale.
And it is most probable that the religious affiliations for Kitto and Taylor are
positive; certainly neither one was at this time a practising Roman Catholic.
14 An earlier article unfortunately uses the adjective "lower" in describing the
modal class status of the High Court justices in the present sample. In retrospect, I can
suggest no very satisfactory explanation for this slip, which contradicts my own research
notes (and, indeed, the evidence presented in the discussion where the remark appears).
The mistake is perhaps best understood as a triumph of mind over matter. In any event
I completely agree with what Tony Vinson has pointed out, idem, and I wish to thank
him for his comment. See also Appendix "Social Origins of the Judiciary" to Roger N.
Douglas, Courts in the Political System, (1968) 1 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF POLTICS
36-47, at 47; and also his critique of some aspects of the scales reported in the present
article, in (1969) 2 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF PoLincs 78.
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The rank correlation of the third or SEP (socioeconomic-political) index
with the age and the domicile variables is -. 48 and +.39, respectively; while
the rank correlation between age and domicile is ±.17. This indicates that
age and domicile are substantially independent statistically: there is slight
relationship between judicial age and judicial residence, for the judges in this
small sample. However, the correlation between domicile and SEP conserva-
tism is moderate and we may well infer that there probably is some important
tie between the degree of conservatism apparent in a judge's background,
and the subculture in which he was socialized-at least, as between Victoria
and New South Wales. Moreover, the moderately high negative correlation
between age and conservatism is an even clearer indication that the younger
judges had more than conservative backgrounds than did the older ones.
Participation
At least as measured quantitatively, voting differences among High
Court justices can arise only as a function of their joint participation in
decisions. If participation were the rule, as it is for United States Supreme
Court justices, then attention might profitably focus upon norms and prac-
tices relating to nonparticipation ("disqualification"), a question which has
not been without political interest from time to time. 5 Or, if some device
assuring randomization were employed, as it is for the assignment of judges
to cases in many American metropolitan courts, then any question of struc-
tural bias in the composition of the High Court could be resolved by the
explanation that this was (from a statistical point of view) only a form of
error variance and due to chance. In the absence of controls to assure random-
ization in judicial assignments to decision-making panels, however, it is appro-
priate to hypothesize the possibility of bias and to test for this against the
alternative of differences within a range of magnitude that could be explained
by chance variation.
Turning first to Part HI of the Judiciary Act (1903-59), one learns
little of relevance. The High Court sits in panels of one justice for hearing
cases in original jurisdiction, and panels of at least three may exercise appel-
late jurisdiction. A majority of three must concur in any decision "affecting
the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth" unless the Court sits en
banc. One Australian authority has suggested, in private correspondence,
that an odd number of justices (3, 5, or 7) is preferred over an even number
(2, 4, or 6) in order to avoid the possibility of equal division; that maximal
participation of 7 or-when for some reason an individual justice cannot sit
-of 6 is preferred for the decision of all constitutional questions, or when a
precedent is being challenged. The same authority observed that only three-
judge panels sit in South Australia or Tasmania, with the Court normally
dividing its terms between Sydney and Melbourne, although panels of five
1r See E. Gerhart, AmmucA's ADVOCATE (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), ch.
15 on The Black Controversy.
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to seven do sometimes go to Brisbane in which event five are deemed suffi-
cient to decide constitutional issues and precedent-challenging cases." With
regard, however, to the critical question of how the presiding judge-almost
always the Chief Justice-determines who will sit on which panels, the
apparently available explanation is not very satisfactory: reference is made to
"settled practices" and to "common sense"-which remain equally undefined
-as the basis for the exercise of discretion which takes into account such
self-evidently weighty matters as the "relative importance of a case" and
the number of justices "available" for assignment. 7 It is certainly a striking
contrast that the Australian Chief Justice seems to have considerable influence
in deciding which justices will participate in decisions, although once a case
has been heard the writing of judicial opinions seems to be the very paragon
of Holmes' "free trade in ideas ... in the competition of the market"; while
the American Chief Justice usually has considerable influence in deciding
who will speak "for the Court," but virtually none in determining which jus-
tices will participate in any particular case.
It does seem indisputable that in choosing the panels to decide the
seven hundred odd decisions in the present sample, Sir Owen Dixon was not
drawing from a table of random numbers to guide his judgment. The average
rate of participation, for all justices in all decisions in the sample, is 3248/7
= 464; and Sir Owen himself set a Stakhanovite example for his brethren
by sitting in no less than 626, almost ninety (88.2) percent of the total of
710 decisions, and at a rate +35% higher than the Court's average.
McTiernan, the next senior justice but half a dozen years younger than the
Chief, participated at the much lower rate of -23 %. Participation ratios for
all of the justices, in both the total sample and the subsets of split and of
unanimous decisions, are shown in Table H, which distinguishes also between
the ratios for the earlier, the later, and the combined time periods. There are
thus nine participation scales; and each shows differences that are highly
significant statistically, in that the probability of accounting for the observed
differences on the basis of chance variation is considerably less than one in a
thousand.'8
16 An analysis of the 129 decisions of the first period (1951-58) shows that 57%
were appeals from the Supreme Courts of New South Wales and Victoria, so the High
Court sits where the business is (and the barristers are). Unlike the United States
Supreme Court, which convenes only in the District of Columbia, the High Court never
meets in Canberra, the Australian Capital Territory.
17 Certain aspects of "availability" are, at least in principle, amenable to operation-
alization: health, and assignment to hear cases in original jurisidiction, for example.
I attempted without success to acquire systematic information about the health of the
justices in my sample for the decade studied; certainly health is a relevant consideration
which delimits the activities of most groups of elderly men. Few decisions in original
jurisidiction (except those which are appealed to a larger panel of the High Court) are
reported, so I could not compare, as one would wish to do, the extent of such assignments,
to the participation data for group decisions. It has also been pointed out to me that
some justices may dislike flying, or for other personal reasons may prefer to work in the
city of their residence (Melbourne or Sydney), and Dixon may have tried to indulge
such individual desires.
18 The X2 one-sample test was used to measure differences in the frequencies, for
each of the six distributions.
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TABLE H. FREQUENCY OF PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS
Early Period Later Period
Judge Unan. Split Total Judge Unan. Spit Total
D .48 .27 .36 D .37 .18 .31
K .12 .14 .13 Me .02 .16 .06
We .02 .04 .02 Wn .08 -. 02 .05
F .03 -. 06 .01 F -. 06 .11 -. 01
T -. 06 -. 04 -. 05 K .01 -. 06 -. 01
Wi -. 23 -. 24 -. 23 Mc -. 22 -. 14 -. 19
MC -. 28 -. 14 -. 24 T -. 21 -. 24 -. 22
Composite Ordinal Scale
Combined Periods (Split Decisions)
Judge Unan. Split Total Judge Rank
D .39 .25 .35 D 1
K .09 .08 .09 Me 2
F .00 .00 .00 K 3
T -. 10 -. 10 -. 10 We 4





One question of interest is whether the structural bias-whatever its
direction and motivation may be-resulting from these participational dif-
ferences, acts similarly upon both split and unanimous decisions, and similarly
during both time periods. For the five justices who served during both periods,
the product-moment correlation between the participation scales for split and
for unanimous decisions is +.99, which indicates that there certainly were
no important differences for a majority of the justices in their overall relative
rates of participation in unanimous and nonunanimous decisions. When we
observe differences between the two periods, we find that r = .96 for unani-
mous decisions, but it drops to a moderate .58 for split decisions. The cor-
relations between split and unanimous decisions for the full courts of seven
justices are .94 for the earlier period, and .75 for the later one. It seems clear
that participation patterns were remarkably stable for unanimous decisions
during both periods; for both unanimous and split decisions during the early
period; and for a majority of the justices, in both unanimous and split deci-
sions, during both periods combined. Evidently, however, there were some
changes in participation patterns, particularly in split decisions during the later
period. Fullagar's participation increased, and that of Kitto and Taylor de-
creased, in split decisions of the later in comparison to the earlier period;
during the later period, Fullagar's and Menzies' participation was higher in
split than in unanimous decisions; and during both periods, Chief Justice
Dixon participated not only at the highest rates, but also significantly more
in unanimous than in split decisions.
Missing data, resulting from the differences in tenure for four of the
justices, precluded the calculation of interval scales for the combined period;
but an ordinal scale for split decisions in the combined period was determined
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by interpolation from the interval scales for the subperiods. This rank order
scale, which is shown in Table II, was used for comparison with other vari-
ables. In general, we can observe that Dixon and Menzies-who were
(respectively) the oldest and the youngest justices, and the ones with the
greatest and the least tenure-participated relatively most often, in the sample
of split decisions; and that McTiernan and Williams, both older judges with
long tenure, took part least often in these decisions of the Court. Differences
among the participation ratios for the remaining five justices, in the middle
ranks of the scale, were less extreme.
We can also describe the extent to which panels of different sizes are
employed. As Table III indicates, five-justice panels were utilized for a
majority of the decisions, and three-justice panels were next in popularity,
TABLE III. FREQUENCY OF TYPES OF PANELS
Number of Decisions % of Decisions
Panel
Size Unan. Split Total Unan. Split Total
3 522 90 612 22 10 19
4 108 48 156 5 5 5
5 1330 540 1870 57 60 58
6 138 108 246 6 12 8
7 252 112 364 11 12 11
Totals 2350 898 3248 101 100 101
particularly for unanimous decisions, followed by en banc panels of 7 and
then (as we have assumed) de facto en banc panels of 6. Panels of four jus-
tices were utilized least frequently, except that two-justice panels were not
observed to occur at all for any of the decisions in the sample. The only
apparent difference between split and unanimous decisions relates to the three-
justice panels, which were used much more often in unanimous than in split
decisions; and this is a difference of statistical significance, with a probability
of chance occurrence of less than one in a thousand.19
Voting
There are many ways in which the content of judicial decisions can be
analyzed. The usual mode of analysis by lawyers consists, of course, of the
interpretation of policy outcomes in terms of legal norms which are inferred
from the language of the opinions associated with decisions. The different
approach followed here will be to examine the opinions for information
concerning the policy issues at stake in the decisions, and concerning the
extent to which individual justices agree and disagree to particular dispositions
of cases. For certain purposes it is desirable to characterize the votes of in-
dividual justices in each decision as being either in the majority or else in
19 This observation is based on a X2 test for two independent samples, comparing
the difference in frequencies for the use of three-justice panels (split, N=90; unanimous,
N=522) with the combined corresponding frequencies for panels of all other sizes (split
N=808; unanimous, N=1828).
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dissent; but our objective here is to classify decisional sets of individual votes
as being either in support of, or else in opposition to, the major policy issue
which is attributed to each decision. Given a sufficiently large sample of
votes so classified, one can seek to establish the pattern of maximal consis-
tency in the data as the basis for a possible inference of a latent attitudinal
dimension as an explanation for the manifest consistency in voting on the
issues observed.
Previous research on the United States Supreme Court has proceeded
on the basis of the a priori definition of the content of scale variables, of
which political liberalism (pro "civil liberties") and economic liberalism have
been identified as the most important in the research published to date."
Although the extent to which this may be true was probably not fully appre-
ciated by the persons who were responsible for the initial conceptualization
of the scale variables of political and economic liberalism, a considerable
degree of sophistication about the prevailing political ideology in the United
States today was doubtless essential to the formulation of appropriate (to
say nothing of successful!) hypotheses. Moreover, these two variables reflect
directly the policy emphases of the United States Supreme Court during the
past generation. The highest court of a different country, such as Australia,
may well (as has been suggested21) confront a different array and range of
policy issues, reflecting the differences in the social, economic, political, and
other problems that arise in the two polities. And it is difficult for a foreigner
who is not a specialist in the study of Australian political society to attain the
sophistication required for preconceptualization of the scale variables appro-
priate for analysis of policy making by the High Court. For these reasons,
the present study does not hypothesize either the American or alternative
a priori scale variables as the basis for delineating the content boundaries for
the sets of votes (decisions) to be analyzed by cumulative scaling.
Instead, we shall follow the alternative approach of associating together
sets of decisional votes on the basis of pattern similarity, thereby building
scales objectively. The manifest content of the policy issues subsumed by
the scales so defined can be observed, and the latent attitudinal dimension to
which these issues relate then can be induced from the direction and range
of the content of the issues.
Our sample includes a total of 187 decisions, 129 for the earlier and 58
for the later period. Of these, 42% combine to form what I shall call, tem-
porarily, the X scale; and another 28% define the Y scale. Thus, over two-
thirds of the total decisions lie on one or the other of these scales, both of
which are perfectly consistent in the voting patterns that they denote. More-
over, an additional 8% of the decisions fit the X scale, and 9% fit the Y
20 See THE JuDIcIAL MINn, op. cit. ftn. 9, supra, ch. 5.
21 Sawer, The Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia, (1957) 6
JoURrNA. op PUBLIC LAw 488.
22 Cf. Lingoes, Multiple Scalogram Analysis: A Set Theoretic Model for Analyz-
ing Dichotomous Items, (1963) 23 EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT
501-524; and S. Sidney Ulmer, "The Dimensionality of Judicial Voting Behavior," (1969)
13 MinwEsT JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 471-483.
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Figure 2. THE X SCALE (Later Period)
scale, with a single inconsistent vote for each decision. 23 Thus, only 13% (24)
of the total decisions do not appear to relate to either scale variable.
Figures 1-4 report the scales, for each period separately. The scales were
so constructed, by periods rather than for the total data, in order to minimize
the indeterminacy which results from nonresponse; and the changes in per-
sonnel which occurred in 1958 would have led, had composite scales span-
ning both periods been constructed, to non-participation equivalent to a
doubled rate of nonresponse. One has considerably more confidence, in
other words, in a composite scale sequence formed by joining the separate
23 These one-error decisions could be added to the scales without depressing the
coefficients of reproducibility or of scalability below conventional levels of acceptability;
but they would add nothing to the determination of the scalar array of justices. There are
however, other and persuasive reasons for questioning these scales because of their
failure to meet auxiliary criteria for scalogram analysis: see W. S. Torgerson, THEOR Y
AI METHODS oF SCALING (New York: Wiley, 1958) 324.
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Figure 3. THE Y SCALE (Early Period)
scales for the two periods, than he would have in a single composite scale
resulting from the maximally consistent pattern for the pooled data for both
periods combined. Even when the data are scaled by periods, thereby avoiding
what might be termed artifactual nonparticipation, the average rate of non-
response in these scales is almost a third, as a consequence of the High
Court's custom of utilizing panels rather than the full court for most of its
decisions. Thus, one possible objection to the acceptability of these scales is
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Justices:
Scale
Item F D Wn K Mc T Me Type Issue
100177 + - - - B 2
101536 + -. . . B 0
105214 + - . . . . . B 3
103135a + - B-D 1
106268 + + - - D 1
101265 + + - - - E 2
102315 + + + - - E 2
101246 + + + - - E-F 0
106205 + + + - - E-F 2
101135 + + + - - F 0
101428 + + - F 1
102029 + + + + - F 2
103135b + + - E-G 1
105071 + + + + - E-G 1
100537 + + + + - G 0
103588 + + + + - G 2
Pro 12 09 06 07 04 02 00
Con 00 03 01 03 05 10 13
NP 04 04 09 06 07 04 03
Figure 4. THE Y SCALE (Later Period)
the argument that the degree of nonresponse precludes the determination of
a maximally consistent pattern, since several different patterns might equally
well satisfy the data; and with no errors, all such patterns necessarily are
"maximally" consistent. (I shall discuss the merits of this argument below.)
A second objection might be that the decisions of three-justice panels, in
particular, often could be apportioned with equal "objectivity" to either the
X or the Y scale. An alternative way to make the same point is to observe
that a majority of the justices (Dixon, Windeyer, Kitto, Taylor, and Menzies)
are positioned in the same sequence, in relation to each other, on both scales;
and if we wish to confine our attention to the five justices who participated
during both periods, it remains true that a majority (Dixon, Kitto, and Taylor)
are in the same sequence on both scales during both periods. Therefore, to
take the strongest example in support of the criticism, any split decision by
a panel consisting of Dixon, Kitto, and Taylor, in which the division is con-
sistent with the specified order for these three justices, necessarily will fit
either the X or the Y scale equally well.' The answer to this hypothetical
objection is that the inclusion of such decisions in the scale does not help at
all in discriminating the scalar order of the justices, which must be based
upon other decisions where no such arbitary choice between scales is open
to the analyst. Hence, they are included in the scale for descriptive rather
than for analytical purposes. To this end, the analyst assigns them to that
scale whose content generally is the more similar to that of the decisions in
question.
24 It happens that empirically the hypothetical panel made no split decisions,
although it did make a dozen unanimous ones.
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The other criticism-that several scalar patterns are possible, for the
same set of voting data-would be more serious, if it were true empirically.
In general, the invariance of the scalar pattern is a function of the presence
in the data of a complete set' of scale-type divisions of votes in decisions,
which in turn tends to depend primarily upon the size of the sample available
for analysis. One parameter which limits the possible size of samples of
voting data is the kind of nonresponse discussed above, which is created arti-
factually when an attempt is made to build directly a scale that extends the
sample of decision-makers beyond the "natural" group who together com-
prised "the court" during any given time period. (As noted above, we have
met this problem by constructing separate scales for each period in which
the personnel of the court differs.) Another parameter which makes more
difficult the determination of an invariant pattern is the use of panels for
decision-making; and here the only solution seems to be to choose for analysis
extended periods during which personnel turnover does not occur, thereby
making it possible for vote samples of adequate size and diversity to be
produced "naturally", as it were. This is what I attempted to do in selecting
the present sample for study.
An examination of the two X scales (Figs. 1 and 2) and the corres-
ponding Y scales (Figs. 3 and 4) shows that we can discriminate the rank
order of most pairs of adjacent justices, on the X scale, on the basis of multiple
observations (i.e., several decisions in which the justice on the left votes posi-
tively in the same decision in which the next adjacent justice to the right votes
negatively). The weakest discrimination is between Williams and Webb,
Dixon and Windeyer, and Kitto and Taylor, with only two supporting observa-
tions, in each instance. The first two instances are the result, no doubt, of
the circumstance that only one (or the other) of the two subsamples of the
data is available to observe; that is to say, if Williams and Webb, and Dixon
and Windeyer, all had served together throughout the total period, the addi-
tional decisions that we might then be able to observe probably would supply
further evidence either to strengthen-or, conceivably, to weaken-our con-
fidence that the scalar order denoted by the X scale corresponds to empirical
attitudinal differences between the pairs of justices in question. On the other
hand, Kitto and Taylor did serve together throughout all except the first
year of the total period, and yet we have but two decisions which distinguish
their scalar positions. It seems plausible to infer that at least in relation to
the data of our sample, Kitto and Taylor are closer together, in their attitude
toward the issues raised by the X scale, than are any of the other justices.
Note also that given only the X scale for the later period, we could distinguish
between Kitto and Fullagar, but not between either Kitto and Taylor or
Taylor and Fullagar; so we could not then say whether Taylor should be
deemed tied with Kitto, tied with Fullagar, or in a separate rank between them
both. Of course, the X scale for the earlier period permits us to resolve this
question in favor of the alternative which specifies a separate rank for Taylor,
but subject to the qualification already noted that the apparent difference be-
25 That is to say, there are N+1 scale types, when N = the number of respondents
in the scale.
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tween Taylor and Kitto is slight, and the additional caveat that a differently
biased sample of cases (issues) might well have produced a dozen decisions
distinguishing between these two judges. Thus, although we might repose vary-
ing confidence in the discriminating power of various positions on the X scale,
there is a single ordinal sequence which posits a unique rank order for all
nine justices.
There are only two-thirds as many cases on the two Y scales as there
are for the pair of X scales, so it is not surprising that with these smaller
samples, less complete discrimination of the scale order of the justices is
possible. The first period Y scale shows four decisions which distinguish Dixon
from Kitto; and the second period scale shows only a single decision separating
Windeyer and Kitto, and no additional decisions which divide Dixon from
Kitto. On the basis of this evidence, we must consider Dixon and Windeyer
to be tied for the same position (i.e., for rank 2 ). We have only a weak
basis (two decisions) for discriminating between Taylor and Menzies; and no
basis whatsoever for distinguishing Menzies' rank from those of Webb and
Williams, since the latter two rank sixth and seventh on the first period Y
scale, and Menzies ranks seventh on the second period Y scale. It is arbitrary
to consider Menzies tied with Williams (as I have done), but it would have
been equally arbitrary to have deemed Menzies to be tied with Webb.
It is apparent from an inspection of Figures 1 and 2, and 3 and 4,
that the merging of the scales for these two periods results in the composite
X scale and the composite Y scale shown in Table IV.
TABLE IV. THE VOTING SCALES (BOTH PERIODS, COMPOSITE)
Scales:
X Rank Y Rank
Mc .......................... I  1
Wi ........... 2 D ........... 2.5
We .......................... 3 Wn ............. .. 2.5
D ............ 4 K ........... 4
Wn ........... 5 MC .......... 5
K ............ 6 T ........... 6
T ............7 We .......... 7
F ............ 8 Wi.......... 8.5
M e .......................... 9 M e ...................... 8.5
Let us now consider the two pairs of scales (Figs. 1-4) from several
other points of view. The scales show, for example, that the marginal distribu-
tions of the voting totals for each justice (pro and con the issues) support
the scale order depicted. In the earlier X scale, we see that McTiernan voted
35-0 in favor of the issues associated with this variable, and Fullagar 0-30,
with the other justices giving support proportionate to their positions in the
scale sequence. Decisions are identified by the six-digit numbers in the first
column at the left margin of each scale; these are citations to volume and
page in the Commonwealth Law Reports. The letters in the first column at the
right margin of the scale classify each decision according to its scale type;
viz., "A" would be an unanimous 7-0 decision in favor of (say) X, and
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hence neither A, nor H (0-7), type decisions appear in the scales; B is 1-6;
C is 2-5, and so on. Of course, very few of the decisions reported are in fact
decisions of the full court; but decisions of panels are analogized to the full-
court scale type to which they most closely correspond. Where nonparticipa-
tion is such that assignment to more than one type is equally plausible, the
decision is given a range classification (e.g., 096099 on the initial X scale
is classified as B-C) and it then appears on the scale between the ranks to
which it has been analogized. Of course, all decisions of the same type are
deemed to be tied in rank order on the scale, and the listing of five B decisions
in the initial X scale should be understood to subserve primarily the purposes
of empirical description and of the enhancement of statistical confidence, since
from a psychological point of view these five decisions are repetitive observa-
tions of responses to the same (that is, to an equivalent) stimulus.
The other column at the right margin of each scale identifies the major
issued raised for decision by each case in the scale. There are five issues on
each scale, as described in Table V. The table shows that three of the X
scale issues, and most of the decisions, relate to questions of economic policy.
TABLE V. SCALE POLICY CONTENT
Issue Collectivism: Pro (X+) N Issue Authoritarianism: Pro (Y+) N
1 Economic Underdog (Econ.) 37 1 Strict Interpretation of Legal
2 Religious Morality (Soc.) 6 Norms (Psych.) 13
3 Order and Security [Anti- 2 Governmental Fiscal
Civil Liberties] (Pol.) 7 Interest (Econ.) 14
4 Socialism (Econ.) 9 3 Judicial Review (Pol0.) 5
5 State Regulation of 4 Judicial Centralization (Pol.) 2
Commerce (Econ.) 6 5 Federal Centralization (Pol.) 2
0 Miscellaneous 13 0 Miscellaneous 17
Totals 78 53
Most of the Y scale issues, on the other hand, are political or psychological,
although it should be noted that in this instance, the number of related deci-
sions is less than half of the total for the scale, because of the larger number
of decisions classified as miscellaneous on the Y scale than on X. Thus, the
Y scale is weaker than X both from the point of view of determination of
the scale order of the justices, and also from that of identification of its
substantive attitudinal content. The clustering of economic issues on the
X scale, and of political issues on the Y scale, suggests the hypothesis that X
is a scale of attitudes toward economic policy, and Y toward political policy.
From a preconceptual standpoint, however, we undoubtedly would have
expected that the second and third X scale issues (pro religious morality, and
anti civil liberties)2" "ought" to belong to the Y scale, while the second Y
scale issue (pro governmental fiscal interest) "belongs" in the X scale. But
28 In sharp contrast to the United States Supreme Court, where civil liberties
policy problems constitute a principal preoccupation, very few cases raising such issues
reach the High Court.
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these empirical data do not support such conceptual clarity; and so I have
located these issues on the basis of how they appear to have seemed con-
sistent to the justices, rather than to where they would have seemed more con-
sistent to me. Having noted these caveats, there may yet be some advantages
in designating the scales according to their respective principal semantic con-
tent; and so in subsequent discussion I shall frequently refer to X as the
Collectivism Scale, and to Y as the Authoritarianism Scale.
Any interested reader can, of course, check the accuracy of my observa-
tions and judgments by checking the data of the scales against the reports
of the cases. I shall discuss here, solely for purposes of illustrating the issues,
a few cases selected so as to present examples of all of the scale types and
issues, for both scales.
X Scale Issues
Item 084442. Cam & Son Pty v. The Chief Secretary of New South
Wales, 84 C.L.R. 442 (10/17/51), is a B scale type which presents for
decision the fifth issue (pro state regulation of commerce). This is the earliest
decision in the total sample of nonunanimous decisions, as well as the first
case on the X scale; but the coincidence is entirely that. A majority of the
court decided, over McTiernan's dissent, that state regulation of food sales
in interstate commerce could not be sustained in the light of s. 92 of the
Constitution. Hence McTiernan alone voted positively, viz., in support of
state regulation of commerce, and thereby also in support of the postulated
scale variable of Collectivism.
Item 102108. Mason v. State of New South Wales (2/27/59) also is type
B and issue 5: McTiernan alone protested the decision of the rest of the full
court, to approve the refunding of permit fees paid under protest and col-
lected prior to Hughes & Vale (in which the Privy Council, reversing the High
Court, had declared invalid on constitutional grounds New South Wales road
regulations).
Item 107208. Queen v. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration
Commission (9/9/59), is type B and issue 4 (pro socialism): McTiernan dis-
sented against the court's decision upholding the recognition of unionization
rights for groups of professional engineer employees of state and municipal
governments. (The majority's decision, that is, was-at least in one sense-
"pro-union" but "anti-labor".)
Item 089229. Commonwealth v Bogle, Clark and Boreham (3/13/53) is
type C and issue 4. McTiernan and Williams dissented against the decision,
of the rest of the full court, that a corporate agency, staffed with civil servants
and set up by the Commonwealth Department of Labour and National Service
to manage governmentally subsidized hostels for immigrants, was a "private"
company.
Item 097248. Shaw v Ipatoff (5/20/57), is type D and issue 2 (pro reli-
gious morality). McTiernan and Webb, the only two Roman Catholics on the
court, dissented against the decision of a three-justice majority which permitted
to a non-relative the continued custody of an illegitimate child, over the claims
1969]
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of blood relatives who were, otherwise, strangers to the child. (The scale
implies that Fullagar would have joined the majority, and Williams the dis-
senters, had they participated in this decision; hence the decision type is
+3/-4.)
Item 087049. Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd. v New South Wales (4/16/53),
is type E and issue 5. A majority of the full court (McTiernan, Williams,
Webb, and Dixon) voted, over the dissents of the remaining three justices, to
uphold the state system of regulations over interstate trucking in competition
with the state railways. Chief Justice Dixon, whose vote was critical to the out-
come in view of his median position on the scale, explained how marginal his
choice had been, stating that (in distinction from the other three members of
the majority, who said that they agreed with the merits of the policy outcome
which they supported) he agreed on the merits with the dissenters, and
voted otherwise only on stare decisis grounds. In terms of scale theory," it
is of course appropriate that the marginal decision-maker (as Dixon was,
with his colleagues equally divided on the issue) should have found choice
most difficult, both to make and to rationalize; just as from the point of view
of game theory, it is understandable that this case should therefore have
been appealed to the Privy Council, 28 A.L.J. 385 (11/17/54). That
court, not being bound-psychologically or otherwise-by the precedents of
the High Court, was quite free to decide (as it did) in favor of the more
economically conservative policy (of unregulated competition) that had been
defended by the High Court minority plus (though ambivalently) Dixon.
Item 097279. Ziems v. The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New
South Wales (7/2/57), is type E and issue 3. McTiernan and Dixon favored
the more severe penalty of disbarment, while the majority thought suspension
an adequate punishment, ancillary to the imprisonment of a barrister convicted
of manslaughter.
Item 097633. Barton v. Commissioner for Motor Transport (7/11/57),
is type F and issue 1 (pro economic underdog). A majority of four members
of a six-justice court upheld the recovery by a trucker of road permit fees
paid under protest, in pursuance of the regulations declared unconstitutional
by the Privy Council in Hughes & Vale. The High Court itself had declared
unconstitutional legislative attempts to bar directly by statute the recovery of
such fees; and only Fullagar and Taylor, the two justices most negative on
the scale (at this time, prior to the appointment of Menzies), dissented in
behalf of an interpretation of a general statute of limitations that would bar
recovery.
Item 097667. Edmund T. Lennon Pty. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Road
Transport (7/11/57), is type G and issue 1. This case was argued with, and
decided at the same time, as the Barton decision immediately above. All of the
justices except Taylor voted the same way in this decision as they had in
Barton; Fullagar, for example, explicitly stated that this "case does not differ
in any material respect from Barton" and that his dissent here was based on
27 Coombs, op. cit. ftn. 2, supra; Torgerson, op. cit. ftn. 23, supra; and A. L.
Edwards, TtcmaQuEs OF ScALE CONSTRUCTON (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1957).
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the reasons that he had given in his opinion in Barton. But Fullagar dissented
alone in Lennon; Taylor stated that he agreed with Fuilagar on the merits,
but that he was joining the majority because "the pleadings are defective" in
this case. Of course, it is quite in accord with scale theory that Taylor, as
the marginal respondent in the pair of decisions, should perceive between
the two cases a difference which none of his colleagues thought important,
and that he should rationalize his differing responses in the two decisions on
the basis of what he described as a question of procedural law. Like the
Chief Justice in the Hughes & Vale decision, Taylor resolved his ambivalence
when confronted with an issue that was for him close by giving his vote to
the majority and his opinion to the support of the dissent.
Item 104274. Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) v. Cardy (7/25/60),
also is G-1, but drawn from the later period (when Fullagar no longer was the
most extreme X- justice) and more typical, than the preceding cases, of the
first issue. Four of the five justices in the assigned panel agreed that a boy
trespasser, who suffered badly burned feet when (while at play) he fell
through the crust of a slag heap on a dump operated by a state railway,
could recover damages; only Menzies-who at no time during the period
covered by this sample encountered an X scale claim persuasive enough to
engage his support-dissented in favor of the government.
Y Scale Issues
Item 105214. Clayton v. Heffron (12/15/60), is type B and issue 3 (pro
judicial review) for the Y (Authoritarianism) scale. In this decision of the
full court for the later period, Fullagar alone dissented in favor of declaring
unconstitutional a bill for the disestablishment of the second chamber of the
New South Wales Legislature.
Item 096429. Queen v. Members of the Railways Appeals Board et al.
(N.S.W.); Ex parte Davis (4/15/57), is B-5 (pro federal centralization).
Fullagar dissented alone, against the decision of the five members of the
majority that only state (and not federal, as Fullagar argued) statutes govern-
ed the right of appeal in a promotion action by a state railroad employee.
Item 088285. Queen v. Kelly (6/4/53), is B/C-4 (pro judicial centraliz-
ation); whether the decision should be classified as type B or as type C
remains uncertain, because Dixon was not a member of the decision-making
panel in this case. Fullagar alone protested the majority's deference to the
discretion of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration to
discontinue the hearing of a dispute after one member of that court elected to
withdraw from further participation in the case; Fullagar wanted to mandamus
the lower court to go on with its hearing of the case.
Item 090024. Australian Boot Trade Employees' Federation v. The Com-
monwealth (4/7/54), is C-3. Fullagar and Dixon, in dissent, wanted the court
to uphold the constitutionality of a section of a Commonwealth statute which a
union sought to challenge; but the majority of the five-justice panel ruled
that the case was inappropriate for the exercise of judicial review.
Item 093645. Lloyd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (12/15/55),
is C-2 (anti governmental fiscal interest). Dixon and Fullagar dissented in
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behalf of the application of estate tax duty upon a bequest of property in
trust for the Navy League Sea Cadets Geelong Branch; but the three-justice
majority ruled that the bequest was for public educational purposes and
therefore exempt from taxation. (There is no mention of this point in the
opinions, but a majority of the majority-McTiernan and Webb-were
Roman Catholics who, it might be presumed, would favor the stretching of
the concept of "public educational purpose" to include bequests in support
of Roman Catholic schools:28 cf. Thompson v. Federal Commissioner of Taxa-
tion, 102 C.L.R. 315, an E-2 case on the Y scale for the later period; and
Salvation Army v. Shire of Fern Tree Gully, 85 C.L.R. 159, an E/G-2 case
on the X scale for the earlier period.)
Item 092565. O'Sullivan v. Noarlunga Meat Ltd. (12/17/54), is D-5. A
six-justice court divided equally on the question of whether Commonwealth
regulations concerning the slaughtering of lambs for the export trade had so
occupied the field as to preclude additional state regulations on the subject.
Because the Chief Justice was among the group (which also included Fullagar
and Kitto) supporting exclusive Commonwealth authority, the state regula-
tions were declared invalid.
Item 094254. Queen v. Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers Society of Aus-
tralia (3/2/56), is type E and issue 3, although it might also be classified as
issue 4. McTiernan, the median justice on the Y scale for the earlier period,
joined his three predecessors on the scale (Fullagar, Dixon, and Kitto) to
form a majority of the full court which ruled unconstitutional a purported
legislative delegation of the power of contempt of court, to the (as it then
was) Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. In an opinion
which is replete with overtones of legal dogmatism, the majority indulged in
the highly unusual step of joining in a common opinion which declared that
"judicial power" could be exercised only by genuine courts and judges.
Item 090353. Queen v. Davison (9/10/54), is F-3 and presents a very
similar question as the decision above, except that the statutory agency in
this case was a subordinate administrative official of the Federal Bankruptcy
Court. Taylor, the next justice on the scale, joined with the majority of the
Boilermakers' decision to declare that a Deputy Registrar of Bankruptcy
cannot be invested with judicial power; but Webb, the next justice on the
scale after Taylor, dissented, and Williams did not take part.
Item 100277. Queen v. Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builders' Labourers
Federation (11/22/57), also is F-3. Like Davison above, this was the de-
cision of a six-justice court which included all except an end man on the
scale, although here the nonparticipant was Fullagar (at the positive end
of the scale) rather than, as in Davison, Williams (at the negative end).
In view of the difference in the locus of nonresponse in the scalar pattern,
this was a 4-2 decision, although Davison was 5-1 and both are scale type F.
Necessarily, of course, the partition was between Taylor and Webb, with
Dixon and McTiernan and Kitto joining Taylor in the majority which declared
unconstitutional a purported legislative delegation of non-judicial power to
2s See Lawry, Education, ch. 5 in A. F. Davies and S. Encel (eds.), AUSTRALIAN
SocmTy: A SOCIOLoricAL INTRODUCnON (New York: Atherton, 1965) at 77-78.
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the Commonwealth Industrial Court; Williams and Webb both dissented.
(The rationale for the outcome in the Kirby and Spicer decisions was, there-
fore, that the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was not,
but the Commonwealth Industrial Court (which replaced it) was, a "judicial"
court; and judicial powers could be exercised only by judicial courts, just as
non-judicial powers could be exercised only by non-judicial agencies.)
Item 097503. Board of Management of Agricultural Bank of Tasmania V.
Brown (9/2/57), is G-1 (pro strict enforcement of statutes). A four-justice
majority of a five-justice panel insisted upon the strict construction of a
marine insurance contract, in favor of the owners of a vessel and against the
insurance company; Williams dissented alone.
In comparing the outcomes of decisions on the collectivism and authori-
tarianism scales, respectively, we can observe that there is a consistent trend
difference in what we might call "the court's" position regarding these two
sets of issues: only about a third of the scale cases were decided in favor
of collectivism (viz., in the positivey defined direction of the scale), but
three-fifths of the Y scale cases were authoritative outcomes. This consistency
in the ratio of "pro" outcomes is not, however, what one would have
predicted on the basis of changes in the attitudinal (as distinguished from
participational) bias of the structure of the court as a set of decision-makers.
In view of the fact that Williams and Webb, who occupied the second and
third positions on the composite X scale, were replaced by Windeyer and
Menzies, who filled the fifth and ninth ranks, we ought to expect that a
court which had become decidely more X- in its aggregation of individual
values would produce a lower ratio of X+ decisional outcomes; and although
the changes in Y were less pronounced, still the substitution of Windeyer (in
the third rank on the composite Y scale) for Williams (the ninth rank)
might be expected to result in a slightly higher ratio of Y+ decisions. But
the changes, although in the predicted direction, were so small-from 37%
during the earlier period to 33% during the later period, for X; and from
59% during the earlier period to 62% during the later one, for Y-that
they are without statistical significance. One possible explanation for the
absence of greater change in the ratios of outcomes is the hypothesis that the
justices themselves changed; that is, that when placed in the social context of
a less collectivistically oriented, generally speaking, court after mid-1958,
the five justices with continuing tenure compensated by adjusting their attitudes
in the opposite (viz., collectivist) direction from that of the new bias of the
court; and vice versa, of course, for the other scale. But this interpretation
hardly seems plausible; the findings of small group research" point oppositely
toward the anticipation of reinforcement of attitudes, which is to say that
if any change were to occur in the attitudes of the continuing members of
the court, it ought to be towards (not away from) the new structural bias.
Of course, the evidence of our scales does not permit us to disconfirm the
hypothesis empirically; but the strong evidence of consistency of rankings, as
29 See B. E. Collins and H. Guetzkow, A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Or GROUP PROCESSES
FOR DEcIsioN-MAINO (New York: Wiley, 1964); and B. Berelson and G. A. Steiner,
HuMAN BEHAvIoR: AN INVENTORY OF ScIENTIFIc FINDINGS (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, 1964), ch. 2 and 14.
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between the two periods, which the scales do provide, suggests that at least
there is no support for the hypothesis in the data available. An alternative
hypothesis is that litigants and counsel recognized the value implications of
the personnel changes of 1958, and adjusted their own behaviors to the
court's new biases, 0 thereby raising what Guttman would call "more difficult"
questions during the later period. The ratio of outcomes did not change signi-
ficantly (according to this latter interpretation) because a court that had
become more X- and Y+ in its biases was asked to decide cases that (in
comparison to the earlier period) tended to present more extremely individual-
istic or authoritarian questions for decision, thereby maintaining a balance
between the change in the respondents and the change in the stimuli to
which they were asked to respond, with the consequence that little change
can be observed in the response ratios. This latter hypothesis seems more in
keeping with what traditional legal research informs us to be trends in the
development of legal principles,"' although a differently designed analysis of
the content of issues-and in particular, an independent measure of the
intensity of issues in cases-would need to be carried out in order to confirm
or refute the proposed interpretation.
The Relationship Among
Attributes, Participation and Voting-
Three attribute variables (age, domicile, and SEP conservatism/liberal-
ism), a set of ordinal scales of the extent of participation in split decisions
(Table II), and two voting scales (X and Y) have been described. In this
concluding section we consider the correlations between variables in these
three classes: to what extent are attributes related to participation, to what
extent is participation related to voting, and to what extent are attributes
related directly (rather than through participation, as an intervening variable)
to voting? Although it is possible to make strictly verbal statements about
these relationships, on the basis of the observation of the data that already
have been presented, we can speak more precisely and consistently about
the direction and strength of these observable relationships if our judgment
is guided by the computation of correlation coefficients. Table VI reports
the intercorrelations among the variables, for the two major periods, with
the earlier period above and the later below the major diagonal; Table VII
reports the matrix for the combined period and the composite scales for the
nine-justice sample.
80 See my "Political Ideology on the High Court," (May, 1968) 3 PoLiTics (The
Journal of the Australasian Political Studies Association) 21-40.
1 Cf. J. Stone, LEGAL SYSTm AND LAwwYis' REASONwnGs (Stanford University
Press, 1964).
82 For a more comprehensive treatment of the path relationships among these and
related sets of variables, see my "Two Causal Models of Decision-Making by the High
Court of Australia, chapter 12 in G. Schubert and D. J. Danelski (eds.), COMPARATIVE
JuDCuL BEHAvIoR: CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES OF POLITIcAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE
EAST AND WESr (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), at 335-366.
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TABLE VI. INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG ATTRIBUTE,
PARTICIPATION, AND VOTING SCALES
(EARLIER AND LATER PERIODS)t
Age Dom. SEP Par. X Y
Age ..................... 04 -. 08 -. 31 .47 .00
Doma ................. .14 .44 .14 -. 46 .79
SEP .................. -. 51 .22 -. 20 -. 49 .16
Par ..................... .29 .87 .40 -. 36 .43
X ...................... .43 -. 43 -. 56 -. 18 -. 57
Y ...................... .51 .22 .19 .34 .23
t Upper right matrix is for the earlier period; lower left matrix is for the later
period. All correlations are rho (rank order) coefficients.
TABLE VII. INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG ATTRIBUTE,
PARTICIPATION, AND VOTING SCALES
(BOTH PERIODS COMBINED)
Age Dom. SEP Par. X Y
Age .....................17 -. 48 .02 .62 .22
Dom .................. 39 .47 -. 56 .34
SEP ................... 08 -. 54 .07
Par ..................... -. 47 .24
X ......................- .15
Let us observe first Table VI, and some of the changes in correlations,
between periods, for the same variable pairs. The drop in the correlations,
between age and SEP (from -. 08 to -. 51) reflects, of course, the substitu-
tion of two young conservatives for one old conservative and one old liberal.
The increase in the correlation between age and participation (from -. 31
to +.29) results from the fact that Fullagar's participation increased from
low to high, and Kitto's decreased from high to low, between the two periods;
these changes plus the departure of Webb (whose rank was moderate in
participation but at the bottom of the domicile scale) account for the sharp rise
in the correlation between domicile and participation. The moderately positive
correlation between age and collectivism remained highly stable at ±.47
and +.43; and except for Fullagar's idiosyncratic position (as an older, but
X-, judge), these correlations would have been almost twice as large: in
general, the older judges were the ones most sympathtic to collectivism. In
contrast, the correlation between age and authoritarianism rose from .00
to -+-.51, reflecting the discontinuities between the judges involved in the
personnel changes: Williams and Webb--contrary to the trend among their
colleagues-were older but non-authoritarian, whereas one (Windeyer)
of the two new judges was young but pro-authoritarian. (Statistically speak-
ing, all three of the named judges had the same effect, that of reducing the
positive association; so the really critical difference was that the other new
judge-Menzies---did fit the pattern of his colleagues, by voting as a young
anti-authoritarian, thereby permitting the correlation to increase.) The other
apparently large change in Table VI, the decrease in the correlation between
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domicile and authoritarianism, from +.79 to ±-.22, is entirely due to the
conjoint effect of the substitution of Menzies (a Y- Victorian) and Windeyer
(Y+, but from New South Wales) for Williams (from New South Wales, and
Y-) and Webb (Queensland and Y-).33
The change in correlation between SEP and participation shows the more
conservative bias in the structure of the court's decision-making panels con-
sequent upon the appointments of Windeyer and Menzies, both high-participa-
tion judges who rank first and second on the SEP scale. However, there is
very little change between the two periods in the correlations of SEP and
the two voting scales (SEP/X= -. 49, -. 56; SEP/Y - .16, +.19) or
in those for participation (Par/X = -. 36, -. 18; Par/Y = +.43, +.34);
clearly, the tendency for conservative backgrounds and high participation to
be negatively associated with collectivism and positively associated with
authoritarianism remained quite stable and was little affected by the two
changes in the court's personnel. The greatest change is between the two
voting scales themselves, from -. 57 to ±.23, resulting from the fact that
Webb and Williams both were + on X and - on Y; while Windeyer ranks
positively, and Menzies last, on both scales.
Observation of Table VII confirms our previous finding that the age
and domicile attribute variables appear to be largely independent of each
other, with an intercorrelation of only ±.17. On the whole, younger judges
show a moderate tendency to have experienced relatively more conservative
backgrounds, while there is a greater tendency for such conservative back-
grounds to be associated with the subculture of Victoria than with that of
New South Wales. There is a moderate positive correlation of +.47 between
domicile and participation: two of the three Victorians are high and positive in
their overall participation, and the other (Fullagar) is average; four of the
justices from New South Wales have negative (i.e., below average) ratios of
participation.3 4 Not only did Chief Justice Dixon set the pace for his court;
he also saw to it that his colleagues who were products of the same regional
subculture helped him to share the burden of the lion's share of the court's
workload. An incidental consequence of this practice is reflected in the
moderately high correlations between domicile and the voting scales, -. 56
with X and +.34 with Y, resulting from the fact that Victorians by birth or
residence occupy three of the bottom four ranks on the X scale, and three of
the top four ranks on the Y scale. Participation correlates in the same direction
as do the conservatism index and domicile with both scales, demonstrating the
extent to which the court's panels were biased toward the relatively conserva-
tive values of authoritarianism and individualism. Table VII shows that the
collectivism scale is moderately highly correlated with age, with a relatively
liberal SEP background, with being reared in New South Wales or Queens-
land, and with not being favored in assignments to panels by the Chief Justice.
The authoritarianism scale, on the other hand, is much more weakly correlated
83 During the early period, both of the Victorian judges ranked first and second on
Y; Fullagar and Dixon continued to so rank during the later period as well, but then
the other Victorian (Menzies) ranked last.
3 The other justice from New South Wales (Kitto) and the one from Queensland
(Webb) both were slightly above average in participation.
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with Victorian domicile, with participation (which in turn is dominated by the
domicile variable), and with age, which suggests the query-which the present
author has no competence to attempt to answer-what there may be about the
political-legal subculture of the one state which could lead those judges whom
it socializes to assume an ideological (qua voting) position which seems to
contrast so sharply with that of the judges who are products of the other
state?
It would come as no surprise to an Australian audience to be informed
that old progressives favor collectivism, although the weak association be-
tween the justices' age and socioeconomic and political backgrounds, and their
attitudes toward authoritarianism, is a perhaps somewhat more novel finding"
of this study. On the other hand, it is less certain whether one might have
predicted in advance (and I certainly did not) that differentials in judicial
participation would function primarily 7 as a device by means of which the
effects of subcultural homogeneity of standpoint might be reinforced. The
allocation of greater systematic attention to the background characteristics
of judges; to the effect of such attributes upon judicial attitudes towards ques-
tions of public policy; and to the effect of both attributes and attitudes upon
judicial decision-making; all these may well prove, in future studies of the
Australian judiciary, to be a more enlightening course of scholarly activity
than to continue to put all of the eggs of research inquiry into the ancient
basket of ratios decidendi cum res adjudicata.
35 Cf. Z. Cowen, ISAAC ISAACS (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1967).
16 Cf. H. Eysenck, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLrInCS (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1954) 128-142; R. E. Lane, POLrICAL IDEOLOGY (New York: The Free Press,
1962); H. McClosky, Consensus and Ideology in American Politics, 58 AMERICAN
POLITICAL SCIENCE REvIEW 366-369; J. Jupp, Their Labor and Ours, ch. 15 in H.
Mayer (ed.), AusTRALIAN PoLrrIcs: A READER (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1966);
and Davies, op. cit. ftn. 4, supra.
37 Note also, however, the social implications of several of the findings about partici-
pational behavior. For example, the finding (p. 11, supra) that Dixon participated signifi-
cantly more often in unanimous than in split decisions implies that the Chief Justice either
catalyzed compromise among his panel associates, or else he was successful in getting
them to acquiesce in his own views. Similarly, the finding (p. 12, supra) that three-
justice panels achieve unanimity more than twice as often as not, while there are no
differences between the percentages of unanimous and of split decisions for panels of
other size, implies that panel associates were much less willing to dissent alone than they
were when conjoint dissent was at least possible. The latter inference is strictly in
accord with what one ought to expect to occur in any small face-to-face group: see B.
Berelson and G. A. Steiner, HUMAN BEHAvIOR: AN INvENTORY OF SCIENTFIC FINDINGS
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), at p. 335.
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